Taking the (quantum) leap with Go

Golang @ Conf42, June 24th

Mathilde Raynal

KUDELSKI SECURITY

About me

Mathilde, research intern @ Kudelski & EPFL

- My work is 1 cup of crypto, 1 tbsp of privacy and a pinch of machine-learning
- when not geeking, I can be found at a bouldering gym
- linkedIn: mathilde.raynal

- under the supervision of Yolan Romailler

At Kudelski Security we:

- are actively involved in research;
- provide quantum-resistant security services;
- run a crypto blog with regular posts.

Introduction

The quantum computer threat is looming at the horizon for our cryptographic algorithms.

Quantum computers threaten the security of **public-key** schemes that we currently use.

They will **not** protect sensible information anymore.

Symmetric-key cryptography and hash function are impacted, but not *broken*.

Source: MIT Technology Review

Public-key crypto... what for?



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

træfik

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

træfik

GopenPGP

OPEN SOURCE ENCRYPTION LIBRARY

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

WIREGUARD
FAST, MODERN, SECURE VPN TUNNEL

træfik

GO GopenPGP
OPEN SOURCE ENCRYPTION LIBRARY

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

traefik

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Post-quantum cryptography to the rescue

Cryptography that is **resistant** to attacks ran on both classical and quantum computers:

- Lattice-based
- Isogeny-based
- Code-based
- Hash-based
- Multivariate
- Symmetric.

Different trade-offs are available (runtime, bandwidth, …) so it is important to extract the requirements of your application to choose the best post-quantum tool.

Why should you *already* want post-quantum cryptography in your project?



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

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

Why should you *already* want post-quantum cryptography in your project?

«Progress has been swift. In a few short years we now have over 20 of the world's most powerful quantum computers, accessible for free on the IBM Cloud.» - *IBM Quantum Experience*

Fully functioning quantum computers will arrive sooner than many have anticipated:

- we should not postpone as *crypto-agility* is a true challenge.

Increasing the key sizes of classical schemes is not a viable option regarding security or performance:

- a quantum resistant RSA protocol would require **1 TB** keys.

Crypto Refresher



Crypto Refresher



Our library

The CRYSTALS suite is made of two algorithms:

- Dilithium, a DSA, and
- Kyber, a KEM.

Both are very promising alternatives for post-quantum cryptography, and are finalists in the post-quantum cryptography standardization competition organized by NIST.

They are **lattice-based**, and stand out for their simplicity, tight security and overall versatility.

They have a **great performance**, and have been shown to excel some of the widespread classical solutions. Their main drawback is their **relatively large outputs** size, which might impact the performance, but is never considered a bottleneck.

Our library

We ported the reference implementation of the CRYSTALS algorithms from C to Go.
It is open-source and available at: https://github.com/kudelskisecurity/crystals-go (QR code).

At Kudelski Security, our mission is to emphasize ***practical*** security, so we put a lot of efforts into integrating as many security features as possible.

Don't hesitate to open issues on our Github!

API

In two steps: first choose a security level, then invoke the core functions.

API

Dilithium:

Type

NewDilithium2() → d
NewDilithium3() → d
NewDilithium5() → d

Core

(d *Dilithium) KeyGen() → pk, sk
(d *Dilithium) Sign(sk, msg) → sig
(d *Dilithium) Verify(pk, sig, msg) → boolean

API

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```
d := NewDilithium2()
```

```
d := NewDilithium2()
```

API

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NewDilithium2() → d
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Core

(d *Dilithium) KeyGen() → pk, sk
(d *Dilithium) Sign(sk, msg) → sig
(d *Dilithium) Verify(pk, sig, msg) → boolean

```
d := NewDilithium2()
pk, sk := d.KeyGen(seed)
```

pk →

```
d := NewDilithium2()
```

API

Dilithium:

Type

NewDilithium2() → d
NewDilithium3() → d
NewDilithium5() → d

Core

(d *Dilithium) KeyGen() → pk, sk
(d *Dilithium) Sign(sk, msg) → sig
(d *Dilithium) Verify(pk, sig, msg) → boolean

```
d := NewDilithium2()
pk, sk := d.KeyGen(seed)
msg := []byte("A message")
sig := d.Sign(sk, msg)
```

pk →

```
d := NewDilithium2()
```

API

Dilithium:

Type

NewDilithium2() → d
NewDilithium3() → d
NewDilithium5() → d

Core

(d *Dilithium) KeyGen() → pk, sk
(d *Dilithium) Sign(sk, msg) → sig
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```
d := NewDilithium2()
pk, sk := d.KeyGen(seed)
msg := []byte("A message")
sig := d.Sign(sk, msg)
```

pk →

sig, msg →

```
d := NewDilithium2()

ok := d.Verify(pk, sig, msg)
```

API

Kyber:

Type

NewKyber512() → k
NewKyber768() → k
NewKyber1024() → k

Core

(k *Kyber) KeyGen() → pk, sk
(k *Kyber) Encaps(pk, coins) → c, ss
(k *Kyber) Decaps(sk, c) → ss

API

Kyber:

Type

NewKyber512() → k
NewKyber768() → k
NewKyber1024() → k

Core

(k *Kyber) KeyGen() → pk, sk
(k *Kyber) Encaps(pk, coins) → c, ss
(k *Kyber) Decaps(sk, c) → ss

```
k := NewKyber512()
```

```
k := NewKyber512()
```

API

Kyber:

Type

NewKyber512() → k
NewKyber768() → k
NewKyber1024() → k

Core

(k *Kyber) KeyGen() → pk, sk
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



```
k := NewKyber512()
pk, sk := k.KeyGen(seed)

ss := k.Decaps(sk, c)
```

pk →

← c

```
k := NewKyber512()

c, ss := k.Encaps(pk, coins)
```

Performance Overview

Security: We provide a library that is both theoretically and practically secure. We integrated countermeasures for many published implementation attacks (side-channel)

	Runtime (ms)			**Size (B)**	
Dilithium	*KeyGen*	*Sign*	*Verify*	*Public Key*	*Signature*
	0.4	1.8	0.5	1 952	3 293
Kyber	*KeyGen*	*Encaps*	*Decaps*	*Public Key*	*Ciphertext*
	0.4	0.2	0.3	1 184	1 088

crystals-go vs go/x/crypto









PQ-WireGuard

WireGuard
FAST, MODERN, SECURE VPN TUNNEL

&

crystals-go

PQ-WireGuard

WireGuard FAST, MODERN, SECURE VPN TUNNEL & crystals-go

- + 2 IP packets
- + 0.2 ms

Attend our talk at the NIST 3rd PQC Standardization Conference for more details !

Conclusion



Our experimental results should be used as motivation to start the transition towards post-quantum alternatives !

Our library is **fast**, **secure**, and **easy** to use and integrate in your project, why wait?

Checkout our other material on quantum security: Point of View Paper – Quantum Security
Our research blog about the library: https://research.kudelskisecurity.com/?p=15394
About the integration in WireGuard: Third PQC Standardization Conference | CSRC

References

Léo Ducas et al., *CRYSTALS-Dilithium: A Lattice-Based Digital Signature Scheme*, 2017
Joppe Bos et al., *CRYSTALS-Kyber: A CCA-Secure Module-Lattice-Based KEM*, 2017

Crystal image by Tatyana from Noun Project