



# Who Goes There? Actively Detecting Intruders With Cyber Deception Tools

**CONF42**



# Hi, I'm Dwayne



- I live in Chicago
- I've been a Developer Advocate since 2016
- Co-host of [The Security Repo Podcast](#)
- On Twitter [@mcdwayne](#)
- [mcdwayne@mastodon.social](#)
- Outside of tech, I love improv, karaoke and rock 'n roll



**GitGuardian is the code security platform for the DevOps generation.**

**Main focus:**

**"Where are my hardcoded secrets, have they leaked, and who is working on remediation?"**

[Dwayne.McDaniel@gitguardian.com](mailto:Dwayne.McDaniel@gitguardian.com)



[@mcdwayne](#)

**Pardon the interruption...**  
**I need to deploy something real quick**




# Attackers Want Your Credentials



*“I must not fear. Fear is the mind-killer. Fear is the little-death that brings total obliteration. I will face my fear. I will permit it to pass over me and through me. And when it has gone past I will turn the inner eye to see its path. Where the fear has gone there will be nothing. Only I will remain.”*

— Frank Herbert, *Dune*  
Bene Gesserit Litany Against Fear




# Uber Breach – September 2022

Uber

## One exposed secret leads to many others!

Some mistakes are more expensive than others. One hardcoded secret giving access to Uber's PAM solution led to an organization wide IT takeover...




# AstraZeneca – November 2022

Unknown number of affected end users



Test environment credentials pushed to GitHub. Another user pushed real patient data to the test environment. Credentials were exposed for over a year before reported. Number of patients affected was never disclosed.




# CircleCI – January 2023

Use of a honeypot alerted the security team of the breach



Customer secrets stolen, unauthorised access to GitHub repos and third-party systems







# We Know How Attackers Behave



# What Attackers Want

1. Access To Data
2. Machine Resources
3. Anything That Leads To 1 or 2



# In the 2023 edition of The State of Secrets Sprawl

**10M secrets found exposed**

in 2022 in public GitHub repositories

**More than 67%** increase compared to 6 Million in  
2021

On average, 5.5 commits out of 1,000 exposed at  
least one secret **+50% compared to 2021**

<https://www.gitguardian.com/state-of-secrets-sprawl-report-2023>



@mcdwayne


# A Brief History Of Cyber Deception



# Brief History of Deception

## Trojan Horse ~ 1200 BCE


*"I thought I was getting a gift horse from the Achaeans ,  
what I got was defeat"*  
- Trojan security officer



# Brief History of Deception

**Art of War**  
**~ 400 BCE**

***"Appear weak when you  
are strong, and strong  
when you are weak"***  
**- Sun Tzu**



# Brief History of Deception

## Ghost Army 1942

*"The first mobile, multimedia, tactical deception unit in U.S. Army history"*

- James Linn - Curator  
National WWII Museum






# Brief History of Deception

## The First Honeypot 1985

***"Hi, is this the FBI? At my girlfriend's suggestion, I used fake documents to trick someone working with the KGB into keeping their connection to a Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory computer open long enough to trace their exact location."***

**- Cliff Stoll**



# Brief History of Deception

## Fred Cohen's Deception Toolkit 1991

*"Under DTK, deceptions are spread among the normal systems in a network in such a way that unused services on those systems are consumed with deceptions. This increases the likelihood of an intelligence probe encountering a deception rather than a vulnerability"*

**- Fred Cohen**

**Fred Cohen & Associates**

### From Honey Pots to DTK

*Focused on Your Success*

**Attack** **Vulnerability** **Deception**

Honey pots: very few deceptions, goal is to attract attackers to the

**Attack** **Vulnerability** **Deception**

DTK: a few more deceptions than vulnerabilities

Copyright © 1999, Fred Cohen & Associates  
All Rights Reserved



# Brief History of Deception

## First Commercial Honeypots 1998

"These hackers aren't kids on a digital joyride, ... It's clear their motive is financial gain."

- Alfred Huger,  
Creator of CyberCop  
Sting



# Brief History of Deception

"Honeytokens" is coined  
2003

"I was developing an idea that I call 'honeytokens'... Basically, information that shouldn't be flowing over the network and, if you can detect it, something wrong is happening."

- Augusto Paes de Barros

## RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots

From: "Augusto Paes de Barros" <augusto () paesdebarros com br>

Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2003 11:17:46 -0000

Lance's point can be expanded in very interesting views. Why use only honeypots "hosts" or "nets", when we can use accounts, documents, info, etc? I was developing an idea that I call "honeytokens", to use on Windows networks. Basically, information that shouldn't be flowing over the network and, if you can detect it, something wrong is happening.

--  
Augusto Paes de Barros, CISSP  
<http://www.paesdebarros.com.br>  
augusto () paesdebarros com br




# Brief History of Deception

## Canarytokens 2015

*"Added aws token  
Added svn + smtp tokens to  
generate"*

- nickrohrbs, Thinkst  
developer in a git commit  
message upon adding aws  
tokens to the code in 2016.



# Brief History of Deception

Honeytokens Becomes Default  
2nd Line Defence at Google  
2023

*"Honeytokens are your early  
warning signs"*

- Kevin Mandia from  
Mandiant /Google Cloud - The  
state of Cybersecurity - Year  
in Review talk at RSA 2023





# What Is A Honeytoken?



```
provider "aws" {  
  region = "us-east-2"  
  access_key = "AKIAZ63VNLHLGVPIZC72"  
  secret_key = "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"  
}
```


## Definition

Honeytokens are decoy credentials that do not allow any access to any resources or data. Instead, they trigger alerts that reveal the IP address of the user who attempted to use the honeytoken.

Honeytokens look identical to real credentials to an attacker.







<https://github.com/GitGuardian/ggcanary>



@mcdwayne

# Honeytoken Options



VS



# Open Source - The DIY Route

- **Complete DIY - see previous diagram - requires Lambda knowledge and time to tinker with it**
- **GitGuardian/ggcanary - Requires Terraform and AWS**
- **spacesiren/spacesiren - Requires AWS how**
- **thinkst/canarytokens - Requires Docker experience**



## Commercial Options - Off The Shelf

- [Canarytokens.org](https://canarytokens.org) - free, one off honeytokens
- [Thinkst - Canary.tools](https://thinkst.com/canarytools) - The paid version of Canarytoken.org
- [GitGuardian Honeytoken Module](https://gitguardian.com/honeytoken-module) - Requires GitGuardian account
- [Microsoft Sentinel](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/products/sentinel) - Azure specific
- [CrowdStrike](https://crowdstrike.com) - Requires CrowdStrike
- [Proofpoint](https://proofpoint.com) - Identity Threat Defense Shadow





# Honeytoken Best Practices



# Honeytoken Best Practices

## Do:

**Put honeytokens in  
your private environments**

- **Since they don't go to anything, there is no legit reason someone would attempt to use one**
  - **Code, CI environments, Jira, Slack, Vault**



# Honeytoken Best Practices

## **DO NOT:**

**Put honeytokens in public places**

- **AWS, GitHub, GitLab, GitGuardian and many other public scanners are always on the lookout for public keys and will trigger them by scanning them**



# Honeytoken Best Practices

## Do:

**Use a 1:1 ratio of honeytokens to repo/environment**

- **Keep it simple. When an alarm goes off, make it easy to tell exactly where, and only where, that honeytoken was embedded.**





# Honeytoken Best Practices

## Do:

### Use automation to scale deployment

- One off honeytokens have value, but blue teams should be worried about defense at scale
  - Bash or Python scripting should be all you need
  - An example

<https://github.com/mcdwayne/honeytoken-putter>



# Honeytoken Best Practices

**Do:**

**Think in terms of 'Blue Team'**

- **Use the IP, UserAgent, and other data points to block access**
- **The goal is not to track down the individual attacker, it is to guard your stuff**
- **If you think other credentials are at risk, time to rotate them**



# Honeytoken Best Practices

## Do:

**Remember this is a journey, not a one off exercise**

- **Start with one repo. Worry about scale and automation once you understand and are comfortable with this, or any tech.**



**Let's check on our  
honeytoken from earlier...**



# In Conclusion





big data  
data storage  
computer  
internet  
analyze  
browse  
intellect

**Information Data**

big data  
data storage  
computer  
internet  
analyze  
browse  
intellect

**Data**

big data  
data storage  
computer  
internet  
analyze  
browse  
intellect

**computer**

big data  
data storage  
computer  
internet  
analyze  
browse  
intellect

**internet**

big data  
data storage  
computer  
internet  
analyze  
browse  
intellect



```
provider "aws" {  
  region = "us-east-2"  
  access_key = "AKIAZ63VNLHLGVPIZC72"  
  secret_key = "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"  
}
```

## Definition

Honeytokens are decoy credentials that do not allow any access to any resources or data. Instead they trigger alerts that reveal the IP address of the user who attempted to use the honeytoken.

Honeytokens look identical to real credentials to an attacker.



# Honeytoken Options



VS





# Honeytoken Best Practices

## **DO NOT:**

**Put honeytokens in public places**

- **AWS, GitHub, GitLab, GitGuardian and many other public scanners are always on the lookout for public keys and will trigger them by scanning them**



# Hi, I'm Dwayne



**Dwayne McDaniel**

- I live in Chicago
- I've been a Developer Advocate since 2016
- Co-host of [The Security Repo Podcast](#)
- On Twitter @mcdwayne
- mcdwayne@mastodon.social
- LinkedIn @dwaynemcdaniel
- Happy to chat about anything, hit me up
- Outside of tech, I love improv, karaoke and going to rock and roll shows!





# Who Goes There? Actively Detecting Intruders With Cyber Deception Tools

**CONF42**



# Toyota – October 2022

Found by a third party security researcher



Private T-Connect repo, that included a key to production data server, cloned and pushed to a public GitHub repo. This exposed data of 296,000 customers for 5 years.

